Indonesia: Islamists won't take no for an answer
Indonesia provides a very good
case study for the persistence and determination of Islamist ideology.
When the nation gained its
independence in the 1940s, a struggle took place to determine the shape and identity
of independent Indonesia. Some were determined to follow the Western model of
parliamentary democracy, considering it most appropriate to the multicultural
and multifaith reality of the nation's population. However some among the
almost 90% Muslim majority wanted an Islamic State, based on sharia law and its
detailed enactments.
In the event, the multicultural pluralists
won the day and Indonesia was formed around a system of multiple parties, with
regular elections and a presidential system. In response, Islamist groups launched
a twelve-year rebellion which cost thousands of lives and imposed great strains
on the political and economic fabric of the new nation.
One particular bone of contention
was what became known as the Jakarta Charter. This was a simple seven word
statement which prescribed that Muslims in Indonesia should follow the dictates
of sharia law. Although there was initial agreement to include the Jakarta Charter
in the Constitution, at the last moment it was excluded. Islamists in Indonesia
have long dreamed of resurrecting the Charter as an essential step on the
ongoing struggle to turn Indonesia into an Islamic State.
During the half century up until
1998, successive Indonesian regimes largely suppressed Islam as a political
force, relegating it to social, cultural and religious contexts. However, 1998
brought about momentous changes in Indonesia with the fall of the authoritarian
military ruler, President Suharto. The end of his New Order regime signalled an
unheralded era of democratic reform, triggering the emergence of dozens of
political parties and refreshing openness to public debate.
However, it is not only democrats
who flourish in contexts where freedom of speech is valued. Anti-democrats can
also take advantage of such an environment and indeed, this new era of reform
in Indonesia provided just the opportunity for Islamists that they had long
been waiting for. Within two years Islamist parties in the Indonesian
parliament attempted to bring back the Jakarta Charter, seeking a
Constitutional amendment in the process. This would have been a significant
step along the road to an Islamic state. In the event, it was voted down in the
parliament, to the dismay of Islamist activists.
More broadly, Islamist political
parties experienced continuing setbacks in their attempts to push their agenda
through parliamentary processes. In four elections since the fall of Suharto –
elections that were largely free and fair – Islamist parties struggled to win
more than 10% of the popular vote, with most Indonesian electors choosing to
give their support to parties pursuing a nationalist secular agenda or more
moderate Islamic programs. By the time of the 2014 Parliamentary elections, Islamist
groups had come to realise that they were not going to achieve their agenda through
Parliamentary means alone.
So Islamist activism in Indonesia
has taken multiple forms alongside the parliamentary campaigns of parties such
as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). There are a number of militant social
movements such as the Islamic Defenders Front, whose tactics are more inclined
to intimidation and harassment and, in certain cases, outright violence against
their perceived opponents. A case in point is the campaign being waged against Basuki
“Ahok” Purnama, the incumbent Governor of Jakarta.
When Ahok assumed the Governorship
of Jakarta in 2014, his appointment immediately attracted vociferous opposition
from Islamist activist groups. For a start, he is an ethnic Chinese, in a
country where anti-Chinese sentiment can be as nasty as historic anti-Semitism
in Europe. So from the outset, the idea of Indonesia's most populous city and
capital being led by a Chinese governor attracted powerful position, especially
from Islamist forces.
The second fact weighing against
Ahok’s tenure as Governor is the fact that he is a Protestant Christian. Again
the idea of Jakarta being led by a non-Muslim was anathema to Islamist groups
such as the Islamic Defenders Front. It took little time for their spokespeople
to quote verse 5:51 from the Qur’an which instructs Muslims not to take Jews
and Christians as allies – easily reinterpreted as not to take Jews and
Christians as leaders.
So when Ahok began his re-election
campaign in mid-2016, his simple statement in one gathering criticising Muslim
opponents for using Q5: 51 against him caused an uproar. Islamists saw this as
a historic opportunity both to bring him down and to shake the very pluralist
foundations of the modern Indonesian state. Islamist individuals working
together moved quickly to level charges of blasphemy against Ahok, accusing him
of insulting the Qur’an. Under intense pressure the Indonesian police felt
obliged to take these charges seriously. This has led on to a drawn-out court
case where the Jakarta Governor is fighting for political survival.
Blasphemy charges against Ahok
have attracted huge international attention, with the clash between a Chinese
Christian politician and radical Muslim opponents being the stuff that feeds a
sensation-addicted media. However it really represents just a small scene in a
multi-act play.
The key sub-text relates to the
ongoing campaign by Islamists in Indonesia to win the nation for Islam in the
most conservative sense: a nation with a Muslim believer President, with
Islamic institutions shaping the structure of state, based on Islamic law and
all that it means for privileging Muslims over non-Muslims.
Islamist warriors for this cause
lost the early debates in the 1940s. They were pushed off the political stage
from the 1960s to 1990s. They failed to assert their agenda in the parliament
during Indonesia’s era of reform in the 21st century. They now have an
opportunity to score a point by bringing down a non-Muslim ethnic minority
leader in Indonesia's largest city, aiming to replace him with a conservative
Muslim.
If one does not admire their
agenda, one can certainly admire the tenacity and perseverance of Islamist
groups in Indonesia to pursue their goals. They simply will not take no for an
answer.
An
edited version of this article appeared on the Kairos Journal website